Frege's theorem says that second-order Peano arithmetic is interpretable in Hume's Principle and full impredicative comprehension. Hume's Principle is one example of an abstraction principle, while another paradigmatic example is Basic Law V from Frege's Grundgesetze. In this paper we study the strength of abstraction principles in the presence of predicative restrictions on the comprehension schema, and in particular we study a predicative Fregean theory which contains (i) all the abstraction principles whose equivalence relations can be proven to be equivalence relations in a weak background second-order logic, as well as (ii) a form of global choice (cf. Definition 2.7). Our main theorem shows that this predicative Fregean theory interprets a variant KPN * of Kripke-Platek set theory KP (cf. Theorem 3.2). Since this theory KPN * in turn interprets the predicative subsystem Σ 1 1 -AC of second-order Peano arithmetic, we obtain a predicative analogue of Frege's theorem. The proof of this result proceeds by using the set-theoretic resources of the Grundgesetze to emulate the definitions featuring in the von Neumann relative consistency proof of the axiom of foundation (cf. Definition 3.1), and by using an abstraction principle related to the Burali-Forti paradox to reduce the complexity of testing for well-foundedness.
Introduction
The main result of this paper is a predictive analogue of Frege's Theorem (cf. Theorem 3.2). Roughly, Frege's theorem says that one can recover all of second-order Peano arithmetic using only the resources of Hume's Principle and second-order logic. This result was adumbrated in Frege's Grundlagen of 1884 ( [10] , [13] ) and the contemporary interest in this result is due to Wright's 1983 book Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects ( [40] ). For more on the history of this theorem, see the careful discussion and references in Heck [20] pp. 4-6, Beth [1] pp. 353 ff, and Thiel [32] p. 43. More formally, Frege's theorem says that second-order Peano arithmetic is interpretable in second-order logic plus the following axiom, wherein the cardinality operator # is a type-lowering function from second-order entities to first-order entities:
(1.1)
Hume's Principle : ∀ X, Y (#X = #Y ⇐⇒ ∃ bijection f : X → Y )
Of course, one theory is said to be interpretable in another when the primitives of the interpreted theory can be defined in terms of the resources of the interpreting theory so that the translations of theorems of the interpreted theory are theorems of the interpreting theory (cf. [37] §2). For a proof of Frege's Theorem, see Chapter 4 of Wright's book ( [40] ) or §2.2 pp. 1688 ff of our earlier paper [35] . However, the second-order logic used in the traditional proof of Frege's Theorem crucially includes impredicative instances of the comprehension schema. Intuitively, the comprehension schema says that every formula ϕ(x) in one free first-order variable determines a higher-order entity:
So the traditional proof of Frege's Theorem uses instances of this comprehension schema in which some of the formulas in question contain higher-order quantifiers (cf. [35] p. 1690 equations (44)- (45)). However, there is a long tradition of predicative mathematics, in which one attempts to ascertain how much one can accomplish without appealing to such instances of the comprehension schema. This was the perspective of Weyl's great book Das Kontinuum ( [39] ) and has been further developed in the work of Feferman ([7] , [8] ). Many of us today learn and know of this tradition due to its close relation to the system ACA 0 of Friedman and Simpson's project of reverse mathematics ( [15] , [31] ). However, outside of the inherent interest in predicative mathematics, considerations related to Frege's philosophy of mathematics likewise suggest adopting the predicative perspective. For, Wright and Hale ([18] , cf. [3] ) have emphasized that Hume's Principle (1.1) is a special instance of the following:
wherein E(X, Y ) is a formula of second-order logic and ∂ E is a type-lowering operator taking second-order entities and returning first-order entities. These principles were called abstraction principles by Wright and Hale, who pointed out that the following crucial fifth axiom of Frege's Grundgesetze of 1893 and 1903 ( [11] , [14] ) was also an abstraction principle:
The operator ∂ as governed by Basic Law V is called the extension operator and the firstorder entities in its range are called extensions. (Regrettably, there is no standard notation for the extension operator, and so some authors write §X in lieu of ∂(X)).
While the Russell paradox shows that Basic Law V is inconsistent with the full comprehension schema (1.2) (cf. [35] p. 1682), nevertheless Basic Law V is consistent with predicative restrictions, as was shown by Parsons ([28] ), Heck [19] , and Ferreira-Wehmeier ( [9] ). This thus suggests the project of understanding whether there is a version of Frege's theorem centered around the consistent predicative fragments of the Grundgesetze. This project has been pursued in the last decades by many authors such as Heck ([19] ), Ganea ([16] ), and Visser ([34] ). Their results concerned the restriction of the comprehension schema (1.2) to the case where no higher-order quantifiers are permitted. One result from this body of work says that Basic Law V (1.4) coupled with this restriction on the comprehension schema is mutually interpretable with Robinson's Q. Roughly, Robinson's Q is the fragment of firstorder Peano arithmetic obtained by removing all the induction axioms (cf. [17] p. 28, [24] Chapter 2, as well as the proof of Proposition 5.3 (iv)). Additional work by Visser allows for further rounds of comprehension and results in systems mutually interpretable with Robinson's Q plus iterations of the consistency statement for this theory, which are likewise known to be interpretable in other weak arithmetics ( [34] Here Q m is the expansion of Robinson's Q by finitely many primitive recursive function symbols, so that Burgess records the predication that predicative Fregean theories will be interpretable in weak arithmetics.
The main result of this paper suggests that this prediction was wrong, and that predicative Fregean theories can interpret a slight restriction of Kripke-Platek set theory which in turn interprets a predicative subsystem of second-order Peano arithmetic, namely the system Σ 1 1 -AC (cf. Theorem 3.2). So the main theorem of this paper can be viewed as a predicative analogue of Frege's Theorem. While we turn presently to developing the definitions needed to precisely state this result, let us say by way of anticipation that part of the idea is to work both with (i) an expanded notion of a "Fregean theory," so that it includes a several abstraction principles, such as Basic Law V, in addition to Hume's Principle, and (ii) an expanded notion of "predicativity," in which one allows some controlled instances of higher-order quantifiers within the comprehension schema (1.2) and in which one makes use of various renditions of the axiom of choice. Hence, of course, it might be that Burgess and others had merely conjectured that predicative Fregean theories in a more limited sense were comparatively weak. This paper is the second in a series of three papers: the first being [36] and the third and last being [38] . This trio of papers collectively constitutes a sequel to our paper [35] . In that earlier paper, we showed that Hume's Principle (1.1) with predicative comprehension did not interpret second-order Peano arithmetic with predicative comprehension (cf. [35] Corollary 92 p. 1704). So at the outset of that paper, we said that "in this specific sense there is no predicative version of Frege's Theorem" ([35] p. 1679). The main result of this present paper (cf. Theorem 3.2) is that when we enlarge our theory from Hume's Principle to a more inclusive class of abstraction principles which are further augmented by choice principles, we do in fact succeed in recovering arithmetic. This paper depends only on its immediate predecessor [36] in that the consistency of the predicative Fregean theory which we study here was established in that earlier paper. Further, since both papers treat this predicative Fregean theory, there is some minor overlap in definitions, particularly between §2 of [36] and §3 of the present paper. In the successor [38] to this present paper, we focus on the distinct topic of embedding the system of the Grundgesetze into a system of intensional logic.
This present paper is organized as follows. In the next section ( §2), we set out carefully the primitives and axioms of the predicative Fregean theory with which we work in this paper: roughly, it is formed by adding abstraction principles associated to equivalence relations whenever we may prove that they are equivalence relations in a weak background theory of second-order logic (cf. Definition 2.7). In §3, we describe the class of extensions with which we interpret fragments of set theory. We call these the class of well-founded extensions, and their definition is structurally similar to the definition of the well-founded sets within Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory in the absence of the foundation axiom (cf. Definition 3.1). The formal system of set theory which we interpret, namely KPN * , is formally defined also at the close of §3. Then in §5- §10 we show that our predicative Fregean theory proves that the well-founded extensions model all the axioms of KPN * . In addition, in §10, we show that in fact the well-founded extensions model the negation of the power set axiom, and in this last section we discuss the prospects of improving this result.
The Predicative Fregean Theory
The predicative Fregean theory with which we work in this paper is developed within the framework of second-order logic. Formally this is treated as an ω-sorted system with sorts for first-order entities, unary second-order entities, binary second-order entities etc. Further, following the Fregean tradition, the first-order entities are called objects, the unary secondorder entities are called concepts, and the n-ary second-order entities for n ≥ 1 are called n-ary concepts. Rather than introduce any primitive notation for the different sorts, we rather employ the convention of using distinctive variables for each sort: objects are written with lower-case Roman letters x, y, z, a, b, c . . ., concepts are written with upper-case Roman letters X, Y, Z, A, B, C, F, G, H, U, . . ., n-ary concepts for n > 1 are written with the upper case Roman letters R, S, T , and n-ary concepts are written with the Roman letters f, g, h when they are graphs of functions. (So note that F, G, H are reserved in this paper for unary concepts, and not for graphs).
Besides the sorts, the other basic primitive of the signature of second-order logic are the predication relations. One writes Xa to indicate that object a has property or concept X. The only axiom governing the predication relation is the extensionality axioms saying that two concepts X, Y are identical when Xa implies Y a and vice-versa for every object a. Likewise, there are predication relations for n-ary concepts, where we write R(a 1 , . . . , a n ). Sometimes in the literature the predication relation Xa is written with the membership symbol ∈, since every model of second-order logic is isomorphic to one in which the predication relation is interpreted in terms of the membership relation from the ambient metatheory (cf. [35] p. 1681). But we eschew this usage here since part of what we're trying to do is to interpret fragments of set theory within expansions of second-order logic, and so we want to limit as far as possible the different uses of the membership symbol.
The expansions of second-order logic with which we work are designed to handle abstraction principles (1.3). Hence, suppose that E(R, S) is a formula with two free n-ary relation variables for some n ≥ 1 in an expansion of the signature of second-order logic. Then we may add to the signature a new function symbol ∂ E which takes n-ary concepts R and returns the object ∂ E (R). Then the following axiom, called the abstraction principle associated to E, is a sentence in this expanded signature:
This generalizes the notion of an abstraction principle (1.3) described in the previous section in that the domain of the operator ∂ E can be n-ary concepts for any specific n ≥ 1. This generalization is warranted by several key examples, such as that of ordinals. Let R be a binary concept and let Field(R) be the unary concept F such that F x iff there's a y such that Rxy or Ryx. Then consider the following formula E(R, S) on binary concepts:
In this, "wo" denotes the natural sentence in the signature of second-order logic which says that a binary concept is a well-order, i.e. a linear order such that every non-empty subconcept of its domain has a least element. It's not too difficult to see that E(R, S) is an equivalence relation on binary concepts, and that two well-orders will be E-equivalent if and only if they determine the same ordinal. Just as the Russell paradox shows that Basic Law V (1.4) is inconsistent with the full comprehension schema, so one can use the Burali-Forti paradox ( [33] pp. 104 ff) to show that A[E] for this E in equation (2.2) is inconsistent with the full comprehension schema. The final element of the signature of second-order logic that we need to mention prior to treating the restricted comprehension schemata are the projection symbols. The basic idea is that one wants, primitive in the signature, a way to move from the binary concept R and the object a to its projection R[a] = {y : R(a, y)}. The reason is that in the presence of abstraction operators ∂ E , we want to be able to move directly from R and a to the object ∂ E (R[a] ) . For, then the equation x = ∂ E (R[a]) is quantifier-free and so will involve no higher-order quantification. By contrast, if we did not introduce this primitive, this equation would be shorthand for one of the following:
So we assume that the signature of second-order logic is equipped with symbols (R, a 1 , . . . , a m ) → R[a 1 , . . . , a m ] from (m+n)-ary concepts R and an m-tuple of objects (a 1 , . . . , a m ) to an n-ary concept R[a 1 , . . . , a m ] and axiomatized by
Similarly, we assume that we have as primitives the resources to go e.g. from binary concept R and object b to {x : R(x, b)} and ternary concept S and object b to {(x, y) : S(x, b, z)}, although we do not give these latter projection symbols explicit names. There are three traditional predicative varieties of the comprehension schema: the firstorder comprehension schema, the ∆ [31] VII.5-6). However, to make the comparison with the full comprehension schema (1.2) precise, we should restate it to include not only concepts but n-ary concepts for all n ≥ 1: Definition 2.1. The Full Comprehension Schema consists of the all axioms of the form ∃ R ∀ a (Ra ↔ ϕ(a)), wherein ϕ(x) is allowed to be any formula, perhaps with parameters, and x abbreviates (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and R is an n-ary concept variable for n ≥ 1 that does not appear free in ϕ(x).
The most restrictive predicative version of the comprehension schema is then the following, where the idea is that no higher-order quantifiers are allowed in the formulas: Definition 2.2. The First-Order Comprehension Schema consists of all axioms of the form ∃ R ∀ a (Ra ↔ ϕ(a)), wherein ϕ(x) is allowed to be any formula with no second-order quantifiers but perhaps with parameters, and x abbreviates (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and R is an n-ary concept variable for n ≥ 1 that does not appear free in ϕ(x).
Sometimes the first-order comprehension schema is called the arithmetical comprehension schema, due to the tradition of thinking of these notions in the context of second-order arithmetic, where first-order quantifiers range over numbers, while second-order quantifiers range over sets of numbers.
A more liberal predicative version of the comprehension schema is the so-called ∆ 1 -formula) is one which begins with a block of existential quantifiers (resp. universal quantifiers) over n-ary concepts for various n ≥ 1 and which contains no further second-order quantifiers. Then we define: Definition 2.3. The ∆ 
1 -formula that may contain parameters, and x abbreviates (x 1 , . . . , x n ), and R is an n-ary concept variable for n ≥ 1 that does not appear free in ϕ(x) or ψ(x).
Finally, traditionally one also includes amongst the predicative systems the following choice principle:
Definition 2.4. The Σ 1 1 -Choice Schema consists of all axioms of the form
wherein the formula ϕ(R , x) is Σ 1 1 , perhaps with parameters, and x abbreviates (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and y abbreviates (y 1 , . . . , y m ) and R is an (n + m)-ary concept variable for n, m ≥ 1 that does not appear free in ϕ(R , x) where R is an m-ary concept variable.
The Σ In our earlier paper ( [36] ) this weak background theory of second-order logic was given the more ornate name Σ 1 1 -OS. This weak background theory of second-order logic is used to define the predicative theory at issue in this paper. To this end, let's first introduce a preliminary definition: Definition 2.6. A formula E(R, S) with exactly two free n E -ary relation symbols is said to be a logical equivalence relation if it is a formula in the signature of the weak background theory of second-order logic and the weak background theory of second-order logic proves that it is an equivalence relation on n E -ary concepts.
Having all these definitions now in place, we may define our predicative Fregean theory: Definition 2.7. The predicative Fregean theory, abbreviated PFT, contains all the abstraction principles A[E] (2.1) where E(R, S) is a logical equivalence relation, and additionally contains Σ While this definition is technically precise, the niceties of this formal definition ought not obscure the intuitiveness of the informal idea. For, the idea behind this predicative Fregean theory is that it conjoins traditional predicative constraints on comprehension together with the idea that abstraction principles associated to certain logical formulae are always available.
More capaciously: if we start from weak background theory of second-order logic and if we can prove in this theory that a formula E(R, S) in the signature of this weak background logic is an equivalence relation on n E -ary concepts for some n E ≥ 1, then we may add the abstraction principle A[E] (2.1) associated to E to our theory.
Our results concern two slight expansions of the predicative Fregean theory: one expansion PFT + GC concerns a choice principle and other expansion PFT + GC + Aβ concerns an absoluteness principle. Let's start with the choice principle. Suppose that T is a theory in one of our signatures. Then we let T + GC be the expansion of T by a new binary relation symbol < on objects in the signature, with axioms saying that < is a linear order of the first-order objects, and we additionally have a schema in the expanded signature saying that any instantiated formula ϕ(x) in the expanded signature, perhaps containing parameters, that holds of some first-order object x will hold of a <-least element:
Since all our theories T contain first-order comprehension (cf. Definition 2.2), and since instances of < are quantifier-free and hence first-order, we have that the graph of < forms a binary concept in T + GC. Of course the postulated binary relation < does not necessarily have anything to do with the usual "less than" relation on the natural numbers. So GC stands for "global choice." It is admittedly a very strong form of choice, but appears ineliminable from our present proofs. Now let's turn to the axiom related to absoluteness considerations. Suppose that χ(x) is a formula in one free object variable, and suppose that δ(x, y) is a formula in two free object variables. Then we say Definition 2.8. (χ, δ) is well-founded if every non-empty subconcept of χ has a δ-least member:
Likewise, if X is a concept and R is a binary concept such that R ⊆ X×X, then let us say that (X, R) is well-founded if (χ X , δ R ) is well-founded where χ X (x) ≡ Xx and δ R (x, y) ≡ R(x, y). Equivalently, let us say that (X, R) is well-founded if
This is a basic notion from set theory (cf. [26] p. 98, [27] pp. 30-31, [21] [23] p. 25, [21] p. 251), and these notions figure crucially in the next section and throughout this paper as we seek to emulate the von Neumann relative consistency proof of foundation. Since we are working with fragments of the comprehension schema, we need to be wary of inferring from (X, R) being well-founded to it being the case that any non-empty definable subclass of X has an R-least element. So we define:
Definition 2.9. Aβ is the following schema, where ϕ(x) ranges over formulas in the signature:
Hence, the schema Aβ simply says that if the pair (X, R) of concepts is well-founded in the sense that every non-empty subconcept of X has a R-least element, then it is also wellfounded in the sense that any non-empty definable subclass of X has a R-least element.
In our earlier paper ( [36] ), we showed that the theory PFT + GC + Aβ is consistent using tools from constructibility, and the name "Aβ" is given to the schema described in the above paragraph because it is an object-language analogue of the set-theoretic principle Axiom Beta used in that consistency proof. The aim of this present paper, by contrast, is to study the deductive strength of the theories PFT + GC and PFT + GC + Aβ and to show that these theories interpret variants of Kripke-Platek set theory. So in the next section we define the notions needed to effect this interpretation.
The Well-Founded Extensions and Statement of Main Theorem
Our aim in this section is to work within our predicative Fregean theory PFT (cf. Definition 2.7) and to define within it the class of well-founded extensions. This will allow us to state precisely our main theorem (cf. Theorem 3.2) which we shall spend the rest of the paper proving. The first step is to note that our predicative Fregean theory PFT includes Basic Law V (1.4) since of course it's provable in our weak background theory of second-order logic that identity is an equivalence relation on unary concepts. Out of fidelity to its presentation in §1, we'll continue to write the type-lowering operator in the case of Basic Law V as the extension operator ∂, so that it and it alone amongst the other type-lowering maps in this paper is bereft of a subscript:
Further, let's continue to speak of elements in the range of the extension operator as extensions. If we need to refer to the totality of extensions themselves, we will write it as rng(∂), keeping in mind that it does not form a concept, since if it did then we could use the ∆ Part of the reason that Frege introduced Basic Law V was that it afforded the resources to define an ersatz membership-relation η in terms of the extension operator and predication: 
Here the sequence V α is the cumulative hierarchy of sets which begins with the empty set, is defined by taking the power-set of the previous stage at the successor steps, and takes unions of earlier stages at the limit step. The transitive closure trcl(x) of a set featuring in the third equivalence in (3.3) is defined to be the smallest transitive superset of x. In the presence of choice, trcl(x) is the set of z such that there is a finite membership-chain z = x n ∈ x n-1 ∈ · · · ∈ x 0 = x (cf. [26] p. 99, [27] p. 45, [23] p. 64). Of course, a set x is said to be transitive if every element is a subset, or equivalently if we have:
The final defined notion in the equivalence (3.3) is that of well-foundedness. In the last section, we already met versions of this notion framed in the language of our predicative Fregean theory PFT (cf. Definition 2.8). Similar to this, in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with choice, a binary concept R on a set Y is said to be well-founded if equivalently (i) every non-empty subset Y 0 of Y contains at least one element y 0 ∈ Y 0 such that there is no y ∈ Y 0 with y ∈ y 0 , or (ii) there is no infinite descending ∈-chain · · · y n+1 ∈ y n ∈ y n-1 ∈ · · · ∈ y 1 of elements y n ∈ Y . The von Neumann relative consistency proof then proceeds by showing that the class of x satisfying the equivalent conditions in equation (3. 3) models all the axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory inclusive of the axiom of foundation, and it additionally satisfies choice if one starts out with choice ( [26] p. 124, [27] p. 113).
Hence, in our predicative Fregean theory PFT (cf. Definition 2.8), we first seek to emulate the definition of transitive closure. If F is a concept, then let us say that F is η-transitive or η-closed if (F y & zηy) implies F z, for all y, x. This is the analogue of transitivity in this setting because if F is η-closed and x = ∂(F ), then it follows from the definition of the Fregean η-membership relation that we have the following direct analogue of equation (3.4):
Having this definition of η-transitive in place, we then define transitive closure as follows:
Frege used a similar notion, which he called the ancestral, to define the natural numbers as the intersection of all the concepts that contained an ersatz of zero and are closed under an ersatz-successor relation (cf. [5] pp. 138 ff, and the notion of an "inductive set" in [35] Theorem 20 pp. 1689-90). Of course, Trcl η (x) is the natural generalization of the classical transitive closure trcl(x) operator from classical set theory, which as we noted above may be defined as the smallest transitive superset of x. It will also be helpful in what follows to have some fixed notation for subset and successor. So similar to equation (3.1) we define the associated Fregean subset relation ⊆ η as follows:
However, note that if a is not an extension, then cηa is always false and so (cηa → ψ) is always true, regardless of what ψ is. Hence, if a is not an extension, then a ⊆ η b is always true. So aηb and a ⊆ η b will behave like membership and subset only if one restricts attention to a, b, that are extensions. So when x is an extension, we may rewrite the definition of Trcl η (x) from equation (3.6) as:
In what follows, it will also be useful to introduce some notation for a successor-like operation on extensions. So let us say that
However, this function is not total, and in particular it should be emphasized that σ(x) is only well-defined when x is an extension. Accordingly, the graph of the function x → σ(x) does not exist as a binary concept, since if it did, then its domain would likewise exist, and its domain is precisely rng(∂). However, when σ(x) is defined, note that it satisfies zη(σ(x)) iff zηx or z = x. This of course reminds us of the usual set-theoretic successor operation x → (x ∪ {x}).
Finally, putting this all together, let us define the notion of a "well-founded extension":
Definition 3.1. The class of well-founded extensions wfExt is defined as follows:
Here the notion of well-foundedness is that introduced at the end of the last section in Definition 2.8, so that (Trcl η (σ(x)), η) being well-founded means that every non-empty subconcept of Trcl η (σ(x)) has an η-least member. Hence this definition of the well-founded extensions is entirely intrinsic to the predicative Fregean theory PFT (Definition 2.7) in that all the defined notions are presented in terms of the resources of this theory.
However, the guiding intuition of course is to emulate the von Neumann relative consistency proof that the class of sets x satisfying the equivalent conditions in (3.3) is a model of the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms. So our main theorem is a theorem on the class wfExt from (3.10) with the Fregean η-membership relation (3.1) . In what follows, we write (wfExt, η) for this pair and refer to it as an inner model, since we shall be interested in assaying what is true in this induced structure. Our main theorem answers this question in part, and it can be formally stated as follows, where again our predicative Fregean theory PFT and its two expansions PFT + GC and PFT + GC + Aβ were defined at the end of the last section: Theorem 3.2. It is provable in PFT + GC that the inner model (wfExt, η) satisfies all the axioms of KPN * + C. Further, it is provable in PFT + GC + Aβ that the inner model (wfExt, η) satisfies all the axioms of KP + C.
In this theorem, the axiom C denotes the axiom of choice in the form that every set can be well-ordered, while the theory KP is Kripke-Platek set theory, and KPN * is a variant of Jäger's KPN from his [22] . Let's first define Kripke-Platek set theory: Definition 3.3. Kripke-Platek set theory or KP consists of extensionality, pairing, union, infinity, the induction schema, the existence of finite Cartesian products and the ∆ 0 -separation and ∆ 0 -collection schemas. ( [25] , [29] , [6] p. 48, p. 36).
The set-theoretic schemas featuring in the definitions of KP are of course defined as follows:
The Collection Schema:
The Separation Schema, wherein y does not appear free in ϕ:
The Induction Schema:
Recall that the ∆ 0 -formulas are the formulas in the signature of set theory which do not contain unbounded quantifiers but rather only bounded quantifiers of the form "∀ x ∈ v " and "∃ x ∈ v ." For the other standard axioms in the definition of KP, one may consult any standard set theory textbook ( [26, 27] , [23] , [21] ).
In his [22] , Jäger studied a version of Kripke-Platek set theory in which the induction schema was replaced by the ∆ 0 -induction schema, and in which one posited a set of urelemente which satisfied the full mathematical induction schema in the expanded set-theoretic signature. Further, as is common when working with urelemente, Jäger's system posited that the urelemente are distinct from sets. If one takes Jäger's system and identifies the natural number object with the least limit ordinal, then one obtains the following system: Definition 3.5. KPN * is KP with (i) the induction schema replaced by the ∆ 0 -induction schema, and (ii) the addition of the axiom schema saying that (ω, 0, s) satisfies all instances of the following mathematical induction schema in the set-theoretic signature:
In this, ω is the least limit ordinal, which exists in KPN * by recourse to ∆ 0 -induction, and 0 is the least ordinal, and s is the usual set-theoretic successor function. Further, one has: Proposition 3.6. KPN * interprets the subsystem Σ 1 1 -AC of second-order Peano arithmetic, which is given by first-order comprehension, the Σ 1 1 -choice schema, and the mathematical induction schema.
The system Σ 1 1 -AC is stronger than the its more well-known weakening Σ 1 1 -AC 0 in which the mathematical induction schema is replaced by the second-order mathematical induction axiom ( [31] p. 294), and so is deductively stronger than the more well-known predicative system ACA 0 ([31] Chapter III, [35] Definition 5 p. 1683). The only non-trivial element in the proof of this proposition, which we verify in §5, is that one can define addition and multiplication using only Σ 1 1 -choice and first-order comprehension in the presence of the full mathematical induction schema. For other variants of Kripke-Platek set theory which have broadly similar modifications as (i)-(ii) in the definition of KPN * , see Rathjen's theory KPA ( [30] ). Finally, let us mention that it's well-known that the axiom asserting the existence of finite Cartesian products in the definitions of KP and KPN * is redundant and hence omitted from some but not all axiomatizations. However, in our verification that the well-founded extensions satisfy these theories, we must first check that finite Cartesian products exist in §7 before being able to verify the fragments of separation and collection in §8, and so we include it explicitly in our axiomatization.
There is of course no way to prove the main Theorem 3.2 except by verifying by hand that all these axioms hold in the inner model (wfExt, η). Hence, in the next section, we prove some useful results about this inner model, and in the subsequent sections of the paper we focus on verifying one-by-one that the axioms come out true on this inner model. If one is interested merely in the interpretation of the arithmetical theory Σ 1 1 -AC, then this is actually completed in §5 where we construct the natural number object. However presumably one of the motivating aims behind Frege's Theorem is see how to do as much mathematics as possible within a Fregean setting, and it seems to us that the natural way forward here would be to look at interpretations of fragments of set theory. In the final section §10, we mention some further questions on how to extend the set-theoretic interpretation given here. Finally, let us indicate and stress that in the remainder of the paper, the default assumption is that we are working deductively in the theory PFT + GC (cf. Definition 2.7). It is only for securing the full induction schema in KP that we need to appeal to the schema Aβ described at the end of the previous section, and when we do so briefly in §9 we will be explicit that this additional assumption is in force.
Elementary Closure Conditions of Well-Founded Extensions
The following elementary proposition is both illustrative of the η-relation, and is an important tool which we use repeatedly in what follows. Basically, it says that for subconcepts of rng(∂), the η-relation restricted to this concept exists as a binary concept:
there is a binary concept R such that for all a, we have that
Proof. Suppose that we have X ⊆ rng(∂). Then for all a if X(a) then there there is A such that ∂(A) = a. Then by Σ 
2.
Transitive Closure is an η-superclass: wηx implies (Trcl η (x))(w).
Second, let's record a helpful sufficient condition for an extension to be in the well-founded extensions:
Proposition 4.3. (Entry in the Well-Founded Extensions). Suppose that wfExt(x) and a 1 , . . . , a n , y are extensions such that the following properties are satisfied:
Then we may conclude that wfExt(y).
Before giving the proof, let's briefly record the motivation behind these names: the deletion property says that anytime one extension a i is an η-member of the other, we can "delete" the extension a i form the list a 1 , . . . , a n and still maintain the containment property.
Proof. By the containment property and hypotheses on a 1 , . . . , a n , y, x we have that Trcl η (σ(y)) ⊆ rng(∂). So it remains to check the well-foundedness condition. So suppose that F is a nonempty subconcept of Trcl η (σ(y)). As a first case, suppose that {a 1 , . . . , a n } ⊆ Trcl η (σ(x)). Then of course F is a non-empty subconcept of Trcl η (σ(x)) and so we are done since wfExt(x). As another case, we may suppose without loss of generality that the list of extensions a 1 , . . . , a n can be split into the two groups:
Then by first-order comprehension, define the concept G = F \ {a 1 , . . . , a }. There are then two subcases. First suppose that G is empty. Then F ⊆ {a 1 , . . . , a }. Then by the deletion property and the hypothesis in equation (4.1) we have that it's not the case that a i ηa j for any i, j ≤ . Hence, any element of F is an η-least element. Second suppose that G is not empty. Since G is a non-empty subconcept of Trcl η (σ(x)) and we have wfExt(x), there is an η-least element g 0 of G. Then we claim that g 0 is also the η-least element of F . For, suppose not, so that there is x with xηg 0 and F x. Then by the relation between F and G, we conclude that x = a i for some i ≤ . Then a i ηg 0 and g 0 is an element of G, which is a subconcept of Trcl η (σ(x)). By the η-transitivity of Trcl η (σ(x)), we then have that Trcl η (σ(x))(a i ), contradicting (4.1).
Further, let's record the following helpful proposition which relates the transitive closure of an extension with that of its successor: Sometimes in what follows we will need to work with a different inner model than wfExt. This is the inner model of hereditary extensions, which is defined as the following super-class of wfExt:
When one is working with models of set theory, a crucial feature is transitivity and supertransitivity, and the next proposition indicates that our inner models wfExt and hExt have these features. 
The same is true of the inner model hExt from equation (4.2). Finally, an extension u is in the inner model wfExt if and only if σ(u) is in it.
Proof. We give the proofs for wfExt-an initial segment of these proofs works word-for-word for the inner model hExt. For η-transitivity, suppose that yηx and wfExt(x). By the η-transitivity of transitive closures, we have that Trcl η (σ(y)) ⊆ Trcl η (σ(x)). Then of course all the objects in Trcl η (σ(y)) are extensions since all those in Trcl η (σ(x)) are due to wfExt(x). Likewise, any non-empty subconcept of Trcl η (σ(y)) is a subconcept of Trcl η (σ(x)), and so will have an η-least element due to wfExt(x). Hence in fact wfExt(y) holds.
The argument for η-super-transitivity is more involved. Suppose that y = ∂(Y ) and y ⊆ η x and wfExt(x). We apply the proposition on entry (Proposition 4.3). Let's first verify the following containment property:
So suppose that a satisfies Trcl η (σ(y)). Suppose that a = y. We must show that a satisfies Trcl η (σ(x)). Suppose that F is η-transitive and σ(x) ⊆ η ∂(F ). Let Gv iff "F v or v = y." Then we claim that G is η-transitive. For, suppose that Gv and wηv. If F v then since F is η-transitive we have F w and hence Gw. If v = y then since wηy and y ⊆ η x, we have wηx. Since x ⊆ η ∂(F ), we have F w and hence Gw. Hence in fact G is η-transitive. We also claim that σ(y) ⊆ η ∂(G). Clearly yη∂(G). Suppose that wηy. Since wηy and y ⊆ η x ⊆ η ∂(F ) ⊆ η ∂(G), we have wη∂(G). So G is η-transitive and σ(y) ⊆ η ∂(G).
Since a satisfies Trcl η (σ(y)), we have Ga. Since a = y, we have that F a. Since this was true of any η-transitive concept F with σ(x) ⊆ η ∂(F ), we have that a satisfies Trcl η (σ(x)). Hence, this is why the containment property (4.5) is satisfied. As for the deletion property, we must show that
So suppose that yηy. This implies, in conjunction with the hypothesis y ⊆ η x that yηx, so that trivially we have Trcl η (σ(x))(y). Hence, we can conclude from the proposition on entry (Proposition 4.3) that y is in wfExt. We omit, due to its elementary character, the proof that an extension u is in the inner model wfExt if and only if σ(u) is in it.
As an initial step towards Theorem 3.2, and as an application of the previous propositions, we now show that wfExt satisfies two of the basic axioms of set theory: Proposition 4.6. The inner model (wfExt, η) satisfies extensionality and union.
Proof. So suppose that x, x are extensions in wfExt such that for all extensions y from wfExt, we have
yηx ⇐⇒ yηx To see why x = x , let ∂(X) = x and ∂(X ) = x . Suppose now that Xy. Then yηx, and since wfExt is transitive by the previous proposition, we have that wfExt(y). Then it follows from yηx and the previous equation that yηx or X y. The converse direction is entirely analogous, and so we are able to conclude that concepts X, X are coextensive and hence identical, so that their extensions x, x are likewise identical. This finishes the verification of the extensionality axiom. For union, suppose that wfExt(x). Let X be a unary concept such that ∂(X) = x. Then X ⊆ rng(∂). By the proposition on the existence of the restricted η-relation (Proposition 4.1), choose binary concept E X ⊆ V × X such that Xa implies E X ba iff bηa. Then by first-order comprehension, we have that there is unary predicate U such that
Then if we set u = ∂(U ), it follows that (4.9) bηu ⇐⇒ ∃ a (bηa ∧ aηx)
We now apply the proposition on entry (Proposition 4.3). Let's first verify the following containment property:
So suppose that c satisfies Trcl η (σ(u)). Suppose that c = u. To show that c satisfies Trcl η (σ(x)), we must show that c is in an arbitrary η-transitive unary concept F satisfying σ(x) ⊆ η ∂(F ). Let Gv iff "F v or v = u." Then we claim that G is η-transitive. For, suppose that Gv and wηv. If F v then since F is η-transitive we have F w and hence Gw.
If v = u then since wηu we have that wηa and aηx for some a by equation (4.9). Since F x and F is η-transitive, we have F a and likewise F w and hence Gw. Hence in fact G is η-transitive. We also claim that σ(u) ⊆ η ∂(G). Clearly uη∂(G). Suppose that wηu. Then again by equation (4.9) we have wηa and aηu for some a. Since G is η-transitive and Gu, we have that Ga and hence Gw and hence wη∂(G). So G is η-transitive and σ(u) ⊆ η ∂(G).
Since c satisfies Trcl η (σ(u)), we thus have that Gc. Since c = u, we have that F c. Since F was arbitrary, we have that c satisfies Trcl η (σ(x)). So this finishes the verification of the containment property (4.10). As for the deletion property, we must show that
For, suppose that uηu. Then by equation (4.9), we have that uηa and aηx for some a. Then since Trcl η (σ(x)) is η-transitive and contains x, we have that it contains a and hence u. Hence, we can conclude from the proposition on entry (Proposition 4.3) that u is in wfExt.
The Natural Number Object
Before we can verify the other set-theoretic axioms, we need to show that if u is in the inner model wfExt then there is a concept C such that Trcl η (σ(u)) = C. This is finally established in Theorem 6.2 of the next section. To build up to this, in this section we need to introduce a natural number object that we obtain from the combination of the global well-order (V, <) in conjunction with the extension operation. So recall that V is our abbreviation for the concept of all objects V = {x : x = x} (cf. equation (3.2)), and recall that < is the global well-order on objects coming from principle of global choice GC (cf. circa equation (2.8)).
In what follows, it will be helpful to have some fixed terminology for some natural notions related to the global well-order (V, <). So we introduce the following notation for the initial segments:
Further, since (V, <) is a non-empty well-order, it has a least element, which we designate as zero or 0. There's also a natural partial successor function s defined as follows:
This function s might be partial because there might be a greatest element in well-order (V, < ). Finally, let's say that a limit point in (V, <) is a point a > 0 such that b < a implies s(b) < a. As in the theory of ordinals, the well-order (V, <) splits into zero, successors, and limits:
We begin with the following proposition, which says that we the global well-order (V, <) is isomorphic to a specific extension with Frege's membership relation (cf. (ii) Further, the function f : V → rng(∂) is injective, and from this it follows that for all d, c in V :
Proof. Let us first introduce the following abbreviation for an first-order formula in free variables b and f and R: 
Proposition 5.2. ( Existence of Limit Points):
If the well order (V, <) has a greatest element, then there is a limit point in the ordering (V, <).
Proof. So suppose for reductio that the ordering (V, <) has a greatest element but there's no limit point in the ordering (V, <). Then everything in the ordering is zero or a successor. Since there is a greatest element b, we have that V = I b , where the notation for initial segments I b follows equation (5.1).
Then we claim that every injective function f : V → V is surjective. Since V = I b , it suffices to show that for all a, any injective function f : I a → I a is surjective. Clearly it is true for the least element. Suppose it is true for a and that b = s(a), where s denotes the partial successor function on the well-order (V, <). Suppose that f : I b → I b is injective. First suppose that f I a has range contained in I a . Then this restriction is an injection and hence a surjection, and so f (b) = b and thus f too is a surjection. Second, suppose that f (c) = b for some c < b and hence c ≤ a. Then f (b) < b and hence f (b) = d for some d ≤ a. Then define g : I a → I a by g(c) = d and g(x) = f (x) for all x = c. Then g is injective and hence surjective, and so f too is surjective.
But the function f : V → rng(∂) from the previous proposition is injective. Hence, by the argument of the previous paragraph, it is also surjective as a function f : V → V . But this entails that V = rng(∂), so that by first-order comprehension the range rng(∂) exists as a concept. But then we may use the Russell paradox and ∆ Before moving onto our next proposition, we need to briefly describe certain definability notions as they occur within our deductive setting. If we're working in a deductive theory and ϕ(x) is a formula in the signature of that theory with no parameters, then let's say that the ϕ is in dcl(∅) with respect to that theory if the theory proves that there is exactly one x satisfying ϕ(x). In this case, all subsequent theorems in this theory of the form "the ϕ has property Ψ" will be understood to be abbreviations for the claim that "for all x, ϕ(x) implies Ψ(x)." Further, suppose that θ(x) is a formula in the signature of this theory without parameters and that Γ is a class of formula in the this signature without parameters. Then we say that θ(x) is Γ -definable with respect to the theory if there is a formula θ (x, y) in Γ and formulas ϕ 1 (x), . . . , ϕ n (x), not necessarily themselves in the class Γ, such that (i) the ϕ i is in dcl(∅) with respect to that theory, and (ii) the theory proves that for all x, one has θ(x) if and only if for all y such that ϕ i (y i ), we have that θ (x, y). This is a natural way to handle, in a deductive setting, the well-known phenomena of definability with parameters.
With these preliminaries in place, we can now state the following proposition, which gives us a natural number object with which to work. In the statement of this proposition, the theory Σ (i) The least element 0 of the global well-ordering (V, <) and the partial successor function s is in dcl(∅) with respect to PFT + GC.
(ii) Let ϕ N (X) iff (ii.1) (V, <) has a limit point and ω is the least limit point and X = I ω , or (ii.2) (V, <) has no limit point and X = V . Then ϕ(X) is in dcl(∅) with respect to PFT + GC; the unique X such that ϕ N (X) is called the natural number object and is written as N .
(iii) The natural number object N of PFT+GC contains zero 0 and is closed under the partial successor operation s; further, for every formula ϕ(x) in the signature of PFT + GC, the following mathematical induction schema is satisfied:
(iv) There are ternary concepts ⊕ and ⊗ on N in dcl(∅) with respect to PFT + GC such that (N, 0, s, ⊕, ⊗, ≤) satisfies the theory Σ Proof. For (i), this follows, since in the theory PFT + GC we have that 0 is the unique object x that satisfies the description "x is the least element of (V, <)" and the partial successor function s is the unique binary concept R that satisfies the description "Rab if and only if b > a and for all c > a, we have b ≤ c". For (ii), we must show both existence and uniqueness. But both of these follow trivially from the definition of ϕ N (X). For existence, we either have that there's a limit point in (V, <) or that there's not a limit point in (V, <). If there's a limit point in (V, <) then since it's a well-order there's a least limit point ω and X = I ω will satisfy ϕ N (X). If there's no limit point in (V, <) then of course X = V will satisfy ϕ N (X). For uniqueness suppose ϕ N (X) and ϕ N (X ). Either there's a limit point in (V, <) or there is not. If there is then there's a least limit point ω and ϕ N (X), ϕ N (X ) imply that X = I ω = X . If there's no limit point, then ϕ N (X), ϕ N (X ) imply that X = V = X . For (iii), suppose that ϕ N (X). There are two cases to consider. First suppose that there's a limit point in (V, <). Then we have X = I ω where ω is the least limit point. Since ω is a limit point, we have that 0 < ω and hence X contains zero 0. Suppose that X contains n. Since X = I ω we have n < ω and since ω is a limit point, we have that s(n) < ω, from which it follows that X contains s(n). As for the mathematical induction schema, suppose that it failed, with witness N x ∧ ¬ϕ(x). Using the global well-order (V, <), choose least x such that N x ∧ ¬ϕ(x). Since x is in N , we have that x is in I ω . But since ω is the least limit point, everything in N = I ω is either zero or a successor. Since ϕ(0) but ¬ϕ(x), we have that x = s(y) for some y. But since y < x < ω we also have that y is in N = I ω , and since y < x we must have ϕ(y). But then from the antecedent of the mathematical induction schema, we have that ϕ(x), a contradiction. Now for the second case suppose that there's no limit point in (V, <). Then we have X = V . Then obviously X contains zero. So suppose that X contains n. Then by the proposition on the existence of limit points (Proposition 5.2), we have that (V, <) contains no greatest element, since if it did then that proposition implies that it contains a limit point, contrary to our case assumption. So in particular n is not the greatest element, and so there is a least element greater than n, and s(n) is defined to be this element. Now, for the mathematical induction schema, note that since there is no limit point in (V, <), everything in N is a zero or a successor. But then we can reason just like in the previous paragraph towards a contradiction.
For (iv), we first produce explicit formulas witnessing that the so-defined ternary concepts ⊕ and ⊗ are in dcl(∅) with respect to PFT + GC. This part of the proof resembles the proof of the totality of addition and multiplication in the usual proof of Frege's Theorem, except that we use Σ Since being a b-approximation of adding a is an first-order condition, if we apply Σ 
The treatment of ⊗ is entirely analogous and we omit the proof here. Now, note that N contains zero and is closed under successor by (iii). Obviously the mathematical induction schema holds, and the Σ 1 1 -choice schema and first-order comprehension follow from those in our ambient theory PFT+GC. So now it remains to verify the axioms of Robinson's Q, which we reproduce here for the ease of reference (cf. [17] I.1.1 p. 28):
Since zero and successor are defined in terms of the global well-order (V, <), it follows that zero is not in the range of the successor function and that the successor function is injective; hence Q1 and Q2 are satisfied. Clearly Q3 holds since any non-zero element of N is successor; this follows from either of the characterizations of N in part (ii). For Q4-Q5, note that this follows from the properties of ⊕ in Claim 5.8; and similarly Q6-Q7 follow from analogously from the definition of ⊗ (which we have omitted here).
Prior to verifying Q8, let us note that by using the mathematical schema, we may establish the commutativity of addition, following the usual proof (cf. [17] Theorem I.1.10. (1) p. 31) . To verify Q8, we must show that x ≤ y in N if and only if there is z in N with z ⊕ x = y. This is shown by induction on y. It holds for y = 0: if x ≤ 0 then x = 0 and so 0 ⊕ 0 = 0 by Claim 5.8; conversely if z ⊕ x = 0 then by Claim 5.8 we must have that x = 0. Now, suppose that the property holds for y, where the property has a universal quantifier over x. We must show it holds for s(y). So suppose that x ≤ s(y). Then x ≤ y or x = s(y). If x = s(y) then we can take z = 0 and appeal to the commutativity of addition to obtain 0⊕x = x⊕0 = x = s(y). If x ≤ y then by induction z ⊕ x = y for some z. Then by commutativity of addition, we have x ⊕ z = y. Then by Claim 5.8, we have
, which is what we wanted. Conversely, we show by induction on x that for all z, if z ⊕ x = s(y) then x ≤ s(y). Clearly it holds for x = 0. Suppose it holds for x; to see it holds for s(x), suppose that z ⊕ s(x) = s(y). Then by Claim 5.8 we have that s(z ⊕ x) = z ⊕ s(x) = s(y), so that z ⊕ x = y. The by induction hypothesis on y, we have that x ≤ y, so that s(x) ≤ s(y) since the successor function is defined in terms of the well-ordering. Hence, we have finished verifying Q8, and this completes the proof of part (v).
Finally, let's note why elements of the above proof also suffice to establish Proposition 3.6. This result says that KPN * interprets the system Σ 1 1 -AC. So for the moment in this paragraph, let's work in KPN * (cf. Definition 3.5), prior to switching back to PFT + GC in the next section. Working in KPN * , we begin via the usual set-theoretic interpretation of arithmetic via (ω, 0, s), where ω is the least limit ordinal which exists by the ∆ 0 -induction built into KPN * , and where 0 denote the least ordinal and where s is the usual set-theoretic successor operation. Since ω is the least limit ordinal, it contains 0 and is closed under successor. Since KPN * has the mathematical induction schema for (ω, 0, s) built into it, we may use it to verify the axioms Q1-Q3 of Robinson's Q. Then the difficult thing is to define addition and multiplication. But since we are working in KPN * , we may give the usual proof that we have Σ 1 -collection and ∆ 1 -separation (cf. Definition 3.4). As one can easily verify by looking at the traditional proofs of these results in KP, the proofs do not require foundation ( [6] pp. 50-51). These results then imply that (ω, 0, s) satisfies Σ which are subsets of ω. But then one can give a proof just like the proof given in part (iv) of the above proposition to define addition and multiplication. So this completes the argument for Proposition 3.6. Having completed this aside, in the next section let us step back into our default assumption that we are working in the theory PFT + GC.
When Transitive Closures Form Concepts
So the aim of this more technical section is to use the natural number object from the last section to show that the transitive closures of well-founded extensions form concepts (cf. Theorem 6.2). Interestingly, while thus far we have just been working with Basic Law V and global choice, now we begin to work with another abstraction principle related to the Burali-Forti Paradox (cf. discussion circa equation (2.2)). Consider the following equivalence relation on binary concepts:
In this, wf is a second-order formula expressive of well-foundedness in the sense of Definition 2.8, while Field(S) is defined as {x : ∃ y Sxy ∨ Syx}. It is not difficult to check that E 1 is a logical equivalence relation in the sense of Definition 2.6. Hence, the theory PFT + GC contains the axiom A[E 1 ] (2.1) associated to the equivalence relation E 1 from equation (6.1). We use this axiom merely for the purpose of finding an first-order way to test for well-foundedness, which we record in the following proposition: Proposition 6.1. There is an first-order formula Φ(X, S) in free variables X, S and in parameter N such that Φ(X, S) if and only if X = Field(S) and (X, S) |= wf.
Proof. Let S 0 be the binary concept on the concept N such that S 0 (y, x) if and only if x < y, where < is the well-order on the universe V . Hence, the structure (N, S 0 ) models ¬wf. Hence, (X, S) |= wf if and only if ∂ E 1 (S) = ∂ E 1 (S 0 ).
We are now in a position to prove the chief result of this section: Proof. It suffices to prove that there's a concept B such that B = Trcl η (u), since we can infer from this and the proposition relating the transitive closure of an extension and that of its successor (Proposition 4.4) that there is a concept C such that C = Trcl η (σ(u)). Let N be the natural number object from Proposition 5.3. All the Σ present aim is to show that there is a concept B such that Trcl η (u) = B. For this purpose, we need only assume that u is in the inner model hExt (4.2). Let be an element of N . So say that an -approximation of u is given by a binary concept A and a ternary concept R such that
In terms of complexity, we should note in passing that the pair A, R being an -approximation of u is a first-order condition in free variables , A, R, u, and so there being an -approximation of u is a Σ These are both established by induction on ; in passing, let us note for future reference that in this proof of Uniqueness, we need not suppose that hExt(u) but rather only that u is an extension. Now, from the Existence Claim 6.4, we can of course deduce:
Claim 6.5. Existence : For all in N there is an -approximation of u, call it A, R.
Since this is a Σ By first-order comprehension, consider the concept B such that
We claim that B = Trcl η (u). First let us show that any y which satisfies Trcl η (u)(y) is such that By. Since (Trcl η (u))(w ) and wηw , we have that (Trcl η (u))(w).
Hence, in fact we've shown that B = Trcl η (u). Note by Uniqueness Claim 6.3, we have that B is the unique unary concept which satisfies the following Σ So by the argument of the previous paragraph and Proposition 6.1, the following is a Σ 1 1 -condition: 
Pairing, Products, and Choice
In this section, we continue establishing elements of our main Theorem 3.2. In particular, we show that the inner model (wfExt, η) satisfies the pairing axiom, and we show that finite products exist in the inner model, and we show that the axiom of choice is satisfied in the form that every set may be well-ordered. Proof. Suppose that a, b are in wfExt. So by Theorem 6.2, we have that both Trcl η (σ(a)) and Trcl η (σ(b)) exist as concepts. It suffices to show that c = ∂({a, b}) is in wfExt. Note that the following is a union of three concepts and hence is a concept:
Further, note that F is η-transitive since the last two concepts are η-transitive, and since zηc implies z = a or z = b and so zη(Trcl η (σ(a))) or zη(Trcl η (σ(b))). Further σ(c) ⊆ η ∂(F ), and so we have that Trcl η (σ(c)) ⊆ F . Hence by the definition of F , it follows that Trcl η (σ(c)) ⊆ rng(∂). The argument that (Trcl η (σ(c)), η) is well-founded is then very similar to the proof of the proposition on entry into the well-founded relations (Proposition 4.3).
In the proof of the above proposition, we showed that if a, b are in the inner model wfExt then the element ∂({a, b}) is in the inner model wfExt. It's worthwhile to note that the graph of the function (x, y) → ∂({x, y}) exists as ternary concept. For, consider the following equivalence of a Σ 
By ∆ 1 1 -comprehension, there is a ternary concept R such that Rxyz if and only if z = ∂({x, y}). So R is the graph of the function (x, y) → ∂({x, y}). Likewise, there is the graph S of the ordered pair function (7.3) op(x, y) = ∂({∂({x, x}), ∂({x, y})})
Since we have extensionality, we can replicate the usual argument to show that
Further, the graphs of the inverses π 1 and π 2 to the ordered pairing function op also exist as binary concepts. Recalling that S is the graph of op from (7.3), by first-order comprehension we define π 1 (z) = u if and only if there is v such that Suvz; and otherwise we set π 1 (z) = ∂(∅). Likewise we define π 2 (z) = v if and only if there is u such that Suvz; and otherwise we set π 2 (z) = ∂(∅). By the previous equation, we can secure that both π 1 and π 2 are functional:
Further, note that since ∂(∅) is in the inner model wfExt, it follows that π i wfExt has range contained in wfExt. That is, on an input from the inner model wfExt, the function π i returns an element of the inner model wfExt. To this end, consider the concept Q 0 = P 0 ∪ P 1 ∪ P 2 ∪ P 3 , where P 3 = {p} and:
These are concepts for the same reason that P 2 is a concept. Let ϕ(x, X) be the Σ 1 1 -formula from Theorem 6.2 which defines the graph of the function x → Trcl η (σ(x)) for x in the inner model wfExt. Then by η-transitivity of the inner model wfExt, for all z such that (A∪B)(z), there is Z such that ϕ(z, Z). By Σ 1 1 -choice, there is a binary concept R such that for all z such that (A ∪ B)(z), one has ϕ(z, R[z]). Then define, by first-order comprehension, the concept Q 1 such that Q 1 (w) if and only R[z](w) for some z with (A ∪ B)(z). Note that Q 1 is defined so that Q 1 (w) if and only if w is in the concept Trcl η (σ(z)) for some z from A ∪ B. Finally, define Q = Q 0 ∪ Q 1 . Then we claim that (7.7) Trcl η (σ(p)) ⊆ Q For this, it suffices to show that Q is η-transitive and σ(p) ⊆ η ∂(Q). So suppose that Qv and uηv. There are two cases. First suppose that Q 0 (v). The interesting subcase is when v is in P 1 . Then v = ∂({x, y}) where Ax and By and hence uηv implies u = x or u = y. Then u is in the concept Trcl η (σ(x)) or Trcl η (σ(y)), and each of these is a subconcept of Q 1 . Now, as a second case, suppose that Q 1 (v). Then v in the concept Trcl η (σ(z)) for some z from A∪B. Since this concept is η-transitive, we have that u is in this concept too, and since it is subconcept of Q 1 , we are done. So in fact Q is η-transitive. To see that σ(p) ⊆ η ∂(Q), it suffices to note that by construction P 2 ∪P 3 ⊆ Q. So we have finished verifying equation (7.7). Now, since Q is clearly a subconcept of the class rng(∂), to show that p is in the inner model wfExt, it remains to show that Trcl η (σ(p)) is well-founded. So suppose that F is a non-empty subconcept of Trcl η (σ(p)). Then by equation (7.7), we have either F ∩ Q 0 or F ∩ Q 1 is non-empty. First suppose that F ∩ Q 1 is empty. Let i be the least such that F ∩ P i is non-empty, and choose an element q of F ∩ P i . Then we claim that there is no xηq with F x. Suppose not, so that there is some xηq such that F x. Now, if i = 0 or i = 1, then we have x in A ∪ B and so x is in Q 1 . But if i > 1 and xηq we have x ∈ P j for some j < i, contrary to the minimality of i. Second suppose that F ∩ Q 1 is non-empty. Then by definition of Q 1 , we have that the concept F ∩ Trcl η (σ(z)) is non-empty for some z in (A ∪ B) . Then since z is in the inner model wfExt, there is some w 0 in F ∩ Trcl η (σ(z)) such that xηw 0 implies that x is not in F ∩ Trcl η (σ(z)). Suppose that xηw 0 and x is in F . But since w 0 is in Trcl η (σ(z)) and this is η-transitive, we also have that x is in Trcl η (σ(z)) and hence in F ∩ Trcl η (σ(z)), contrary to hypothesis.
Finally, we verify the axiom of choice, in the form that every set can be well-ordered (this axiom was designated C in our statement of the main Theorem 3.2): Proposition 7.3. The inner model (wfExt, η) satisfies the axiom C that every set can be well-ordered.
Proof. So suppose that x is in the inner model wfExt. Choose X such that ∂(X) = x. Let R be the restriction of the global well-order < to X, i.e. Ryz if and only if Xy & Xz & y < z. Let r be the extension of the image of R under the action of the ordered pair function op. Note that the product x × x exists in the inner model wfExt by Proposition 7.2. Since r ⊆ η x × x, we have that r is in the inner model wfExt by η-super-transitivity.
∆ 0 -Separation and ∆ 0 -Collection
The aim of this present section is to verify further components of our main theorem (Theorem 3.2), and in particular that the inner model (wfExt, η) satisfies the ∆ 0 -separation schema and the ∆ 0 -collection schema. See Definition 3.4 for the definitions of these schemata. These proofs are by induction on the complexity of formula, and so here we just recall that the ∆ 0 -formulas are the smallest class of formulas in the signature of set-theory which contains the atomic formulas and is closed under the propositional connectives and the bounded quantifiers. Proof. So for each ∆ 0 -formula ϕ(x, z) in the signature consisting just of the binary relation η and each d, p in the inner model wfExt, it must be shown that there is c in the inner model wfExt such that
Using the ordered pairing function op defined in equation (7.3), let us define op 1 (x 1 ) = x 1 and op 2 (x 1 , x 2 ) = op(x 1 , x 2 ) and op n+1 (x 1 , . . . , x n , x n+1 ) = op(op(x 1 , . . . , x n ), x n+1 ). Just as the graph of op exists as a ternary concept, so the graph of op n exists as a (n+1)-ary concept. Further, in the previous section we showed that the products a × b is an element of the inner model wfExt whenever a, b are. Likewise, we define the finite products d 1 × · · · × d n ; and the inner model wfExt is likewise closed under these finite products. So, it suffices to show that for each ∆ 0 -formula ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x n , z) and for each d 1 , . . . , d n , p in the inner model wfExt, there is c in the inner model wfExt such that
The proof is by induction on the complexity of formula. First suppose that ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x n , p) ≡
By the proposition on the existence of restricted η-relation (Proposition 4.1), choose binary concept R such that
Consider the following n-ary concept S:
Let C be the image of the concept S under the function op n , which exists by first-order comprehension. Then we have that c is in the inner model wfExt by supertransitivity. Second, consider the case ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x n , p) ≡ p i ηx j . Letting R be as above, we can take c to be the extension of the image of the following concept under the function op n :
We omit the base cases for ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x n , p) ≡ x i ηp j and ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x n , p) ≡ x i = x j since they are comparatively routine. Now, for the induction steps. Suppose the result holds for both ϕ 0 and ϕ 1 . We must show that it holds for ϕ 0 ∧ ϕ 1 and ¬ϕ 0 . This follows because the inner model wfExt is closed under intersections and relative complements. 
For the induction step, we must show that for all d 1 , . . . , d n-1 and p in the inner model there is c in the inner model such that
Now, by Theorem 6.2, we have that
is in the inner model wfExt. By the induction hypotheses, there is c such that
Let C such that ∂(C ) = c . Then by first-order comprehension define the following (n-1)-ary concept wherein
Then let C be the image of R under the function op n-1 , and let c = ∂(C). Then c is in the inner model by supertransitivity since one has the containment c
Prior to establishing the satisfaction of ∆ 0 -collection on the inner model in the next proposition, here we need a preliminary proposition on the complexity of ∆ 0 -satisfaction in the inner model. Intuitively this lemma says that ∆ 0 -satisfaction is uniformly ∆ . . . , X n ) in the signature of PFT + GC with all free variables displayed such that for all X 1 , . . . , X n with x i = ∂(X i ) being an element of the inner model wfExt, we have
Proof. The proof is by induction on the complexity of the formula ϕ. First suppose that ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) ≡ x i ηx j . Then the Σ 1 -formula may be taken to be the arithmetical definition of X i = X j . The induction steps for the propositional connectives follows from the fact that the complexity class ∆ 1 1 is trivially closed under disjunction, conjunction, and negation. Suppose that the induction hypothesis holds for ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) and consider now the case of ∃ x n ηx i ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) where i < n. Then by induction for x 1 = ∂(X 1 ), . . . , x n-1 = ∂(X n-1 ) in the inner model wfExt this is equivalent to the Σ 1 1 -condition:
. . , X n , Z) where without loss of generality Ψ 0 contains no higher-order quantifiers. Then, we claim that, for x 1 = ∂(X 1 ), . . . , x n-1 = ∂(X n-1 ) in the inner model wfExt, the condition ∃ x n ηx i ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) is equivalent to the Π 1 1 -condition:
To see this equivalence, first suppose that ∃ x n ηx i ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) but that equation (8.11) failed, with witnesses R, R satisfying:
Since we're supposing that ∃ x n ηx i ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x n ), choose a witness a such that aηx i and ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x n-1 , a). Then by equation (8.12), we have a = ∂(R[a]) as well as
By the induction hypothesis, this implies that we have ¬ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x n-1 , a), which is a contradiction. Now, for the converse direction of the equivalence, suppose that ∃ x n ηx i ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) fails. Then of course we have ∀ x n ηx i ¬ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x n ). From this and the induction hypothesis, we have that
Then by Σ 
Then by first-order comprehension, define
and let w = ∂(W ). It suffices to show wfExt(w). To this end, let ξ(x, X) be the Σ 
∆ 0 -Induction and Full Induction
The aim of this section is to complete the verification of the induction schema. More specifically, while our predicative Fregean theory PFT + GC models ∆ 0 -induction, if we expand by the additional axiom Aβ, we are able to get the full induction schema. Recall that the induction schema says that any instantiated formula is instantiated by some minimal element (Definition 3.4), while the schema Aβ says that any formula which well-founded with respect to concepts is well-founded with respect to formulas as well (cf. close of §2).
Let's first establish the result about ∆ 0 -induction. The proof of this result is, like the others in these last sections, a proof in PFT + GC. It is only the subsequent proof of the full induction schema which requires us to invoke the further axiom schema Aβ. In this case, we are done. So suppose that this equation fails. Let t = ∂(Trcl η (σ(d))), which is an element of the inner model wfExt by Theorem 6.2. By ∆ 0 -separation, choose c in the inner model wfExt such that
is non-empty. Since t is a member of the inner model wfExt, choose c such that Cc and for all z, Cz implies ¬zηc . Since c ηc, we have that (wfExt, η) |= ϕ(c , p). Suppose that zηc and (wfExt, η) |= ϕ(z, p). Since zηc and c ηt, we have zηt since Trcl η (σ(d)) is η-transitive. Then by the precious equation we have zηc or Cz, which implies ¬zηc , a contradiction.
Finally, we have the result for full induction, where we explicitly indicate in its statement that we are working in the larger theory PFT + GC + Aβ: Proposition 9.2. (PFT + GC + Aβ) The inner model (wfExt, η) satisfies the full induction schema.
Proof. So suppose that ϕ(x, z) is a formula in the signature consisting just of the binary relation η and suppose that d, p are members of the inner model wfExt such that (wfExt, η) |= ϕ(d, p). There are two cases to consider. First suppose that (9.3) (wfExt, η) |= ∀ yηd ¬ϕ(y, p)
In this case, we are done. So suppose that this equation fails, so that (9.4) (wfExt, η) |= ∃ yηd ϕ(y, p)
Let T = Trcl η (σ(d)) and let t = ∂(T ), so that T is a concept and t is an element of the inner model wfExt by Theorem 6.2. Further, by the proposition on existence of restricted η-relation (Proposition 4.1), choose binary concept E T such that T a implies: E T (b, a) iff bηa.
Then by the previous equation, one has that yηd and dηt implies that yηt, so that (9.5) (wfExt, η) |= ∃ yηt ϕ(y, p)
Further, since t an element of the inner model, one has that (T, E T ) is well-founded in the sense that any non-empty subconcept has an E T -least member. By Axiom Aβ, it is also well-founded in the sense that any instantiated subformula has an E T -least member, which is the same as an η-least member since T is η-transitive. Consider the following formula γ(y), which is instantiated by the previous equation: Since γ(y) is an instantiated subformula of T y, it has an η-least element, call it c . Suppose that z in the inner model wfExt was such that (9.7) wfExt |= (zηc ∧ ϕ(z, p))
Then since T is η-transitive, one has that zηc and c ηt implies zηt, so that T z and hence γ(z). But then by minimality of c we have ¬(zηc ), and so we have reached a contradiction. So we've shown: Let's first show that (wfExt, η) models ¬Powerset. The proof of this result follows broadly the proof of Cantor's theorem that |P (X)| > |X|. So suppose that the result fails and we have that (wfExt, η) |= Powerset. Then we have that the power set P (ρ) of ρ is also in the inner model wfExt. Let P be a concept such that ∂(P ) = P (ρ). By the proposition on the existence of the restricted η-relation (Proposition 4.1), choose a relation S such that P w implies ∂(S[w]) = w. Define an injection g : P → Q by g = f P , so that the binary concept that is the graph of g also exists as a binary concept. Use the graph of this injection to define a surjection h : Q → P . Then the concept P 0 = {w : Qw & ¬(wηh(w))} = {w : Qw & ¬(S[h(w)])(w)} exists by first-order comprehension. Then define p 0 = ∂(P 0 ). By η-supertransitivity, p 0 is in the inner model wfExt, and hence in P . Since h : Q → P is surjective, there is w 0 in Q such that h(w 0 ) = p 0 . Then we either have w 0 ηh(w 0 ) or not. Either way, we get a contradiction. Now let's show that (wfExt, η) models Infinity. Define Q 0 = f N and ρ 0 = ∂(Q 0 ). Then by η-supertransitivity, we have that ρ in wfExt implies that ρ 0 is in wfExt. If we let e designate the extension of the empty concept ∅, i.e. e = ∂(∅), then clearly Q 0 (e) since e = ∂(∅) = ∂(R[0]) = f (0), where 0 denotes the least element of the order (V, < ). Now suppose that αηρ 0 . It suffices to show that σ(α)ηρ 0 . So choose a from V such that α = f (a) = ∂(R[a]) and let b = s(a), where s denotes the successor function on (N, <), and let β = f (b). Clearly βηρ 0 . Further, we claim that β = σ(α). This follows from the observation that β = f (b) = ∂({f (d) : d ∈ I a } ∪ {f (a)}) = ∂(R[a] ∪ {α}).
With this, the proof of the main theorem (Theorem 3.2) is finished. There are several ways in which one might hope to improve this result. It's known by the results of our paper ( [36] ) that there are models of PFT + GC on which the well-founded extensions model all of the axiom of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the exception of the power set axiom. So it is conceivable that the theory PFT + GC interprets all of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the exception of the power set axiom. This would be a significant strengthening of the result of this paper. However, as we have seen in the last section, it seems that the most natural way to secure all of the induction schema is by the addition of the axiom schema Aβ, and it is not presently obvious if one can establish in PFT + GC plus the failure of Aβ that the induction schema holds in full generality on the well-founded extensions. The model constructions in the paper [36] do not obviously lead to any countermodels.
A distinct way forward might be to find some suitable subclass of the well-founded extensions with which to work. For instance, perhaps one might look at well-founded extensions which satisfied some "limitation of size" principle. This kind of maneuver might be one way to avoid the satisfaction of the negation of the power set axiom. A third and final way to improve our results is by expanding to a larger class of abstraction principles besides those contained in the theory PFT. For instance, to show that the well-founded extensions satisfy the separation schema with respect to a first-order formula ϕ(x) in the signature of set theory, it would suffice for the theory to contain the abstraction principle associated to the following equivalence relation: However, this kind of abstraction principle is not covered by PFT itself, since E ϕ contains reference to the extension operator ∂ and hence is not a logical equivalence relation in the sense of Definition 2.6.
Moreover, it is not difficult to see that an entirely unrestricted theory of "iterated" predicative abstraction principles will be inconsistent. For instance, the following equivalence relation also contains reference to the extension operator: This equivalence relation splits the concepts into three classes: those that are not singletons, those that are singletons whose sole element is in the range of the extension operator, and those that are singletons whose sole element is not in the range of the extension operator. In a theory containing the abstraction principle A[E] (2.1) associated to E, one could then use first-order comprehension to form the concept {x : ∂ E ({x}) = ∂ E (X 0 )} where X 0 was some singleton containing an extension. This concept would be equal to the range of the extension operator and so one could replicate the Russell paradox. So if one wanted to expand the predicative Fregean theory PFT by further abstraction operators, one would need to find some well-motivated way to avoid such equivalence relations which permit the reduplication of the Russell paradox.
